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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1959
of the act, but apparently neither the judge nor counsel for either side
knew of its application. There was a thorough examination of the
panel, but not under oath. No request was made to swear them, no
objection was made for failure to do so, and none was made as to the
manner of the selection of the jury. On appeal, however, it was as-
signed as error.
The Court of Appeals for Montgomery County held that if it
were to sustain the assignment of error, "it must be solely upon the
letter of the statute.' 24 It refused to do so, "in view of the fact that
it is clear that no prejudice resulted to appellant by the procedure
followed in the selection of the jury."2 5
Another error of a technical nature occurred in the same case.
After deliberation, the jury indicated that it had reached a verdict.
The jury was brought into court and the clerk read the verdict, which
the judge accepted. He thanked the jury and excused them, only to
discover half an hour later that only eight jurors had signed the ver-
dict. They were reconvened and it was discovered that one other
juror concurred in the verdict, but had failed to sign it. The judge
instructed this one to sign, which he did, whereupon the verdict was
accepted in original form with the added signature.
Citing Ohio Revised Code section 2315.11, the court of appeals
held that the original verdict was defective in form only, and, with
the assent of the jurors, subject to correction. While the statute pre-
scribes that the correction shall be "before their discharge," the first
discharge had been unauthorized by statute and, therefore, actually
not a discharge at all.
The court distinguished two older cases in which the verdict first
brought in had been complete, and in which the attempted changes
were ones of substance.28
SAMUEL SONENFIELD
FUTURE INTERESTS
JUDICIAL OPINIONS BASED UPON ARCHAIC, INACCURATE,
AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS
Prior to the Statute of Uses (1536) it was not possible in Eng-
land to create any form of legal future interest in a third person other
than a remainder. A remainder could neither cut off nor follow a
fee simple estate. Consequently, statements appeared in cases and
texts that there could not be a fee simple estate after a fee simple
24. Id. at 196.
25. Ibid.
26. Boyer v. Maloney, 27 Ohio App. 52, 160 N.E. 740 (1927); Niebling v. Laidlaw, 12
Ohio C.C.R.(ns.) 463, 22 Ohio C.C. Dec. 371 (1909).
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estate or, more briefly, there could not be a fee after a fee.' The
same idea was expressed in another form by the statement that there
cannot be a remainder after a fee simple estate.' These statements
were certainly true with respect to legal future interests prior to the
Statute of Uses.
After the Statute of Uses (1536) it was possible to create a legal
future interest in a third person by an inter vivos conveyance which
would either defeat or follow a fee simple estate, and this fact was
recognized by early texts and decisions.3  Thus, it was possible to
create a fee after a fee. The future interest which defeats or fol-
lows a defeasible fee simple estate is called an executory interest, to
distinguish it from a remainder.4 The only limitation imposed upon
these executory interests is that they must either vest or not vest with-
in the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities. With the adoption of
the Statute of Wills in 1540, executory interests could be created also
by will, subject only to the limitations of the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties.
Unfortunately, the statement that there could not be a fee after a
fee, which was accurate prior to 1536 but inaccurate thereafter, has
been repeated as if still valid in some American cases.5 The confu-
sion which resulted from this repetition has plagued some jurisdic-
tions, including Ohio, to the present time. The opinion in Sheldon
v. Lewis,6 although written in 1959, at a time when the inaccuracy of
the earlier statements had been repeatedly explained in many reliable
texts and carefully written opinions, is an example of the failure of
the court to understand the nature of executory interests and the ef-
fect of the Statute of Uses.
In the Sheldon case the testator, in item two of his will, left all
his real and personal property to his brother, A, and his two sisters,
B and C, so that each received one-third, charged with the payment
of certain legacies. In item three, testator qualified the gift in item
two by providing that upon the death of either J or C, "the interest
1. "The rule that a fee could not be limited upon a fee had its foundation in the necessity of
livery of seizin to the transfer of a fee." Harder v. Matthews, 309 Ill. 548, 557, 141 N.E.
442, 445 (1923).
2. 4 KENT, COMMENTARIES *199 (13th ed. 1884).
3. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *173, *334 (Lewis' ed. 1902); 4 KENT, COMMEN-
TARIES *199 (13th ed. 1884).
4. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.53 (1952); SIMES & SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS § 221 (2d ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 25, comments d and e (1936).
5. "Older cases, and an occasional recent case following anachronistic practice, find difficulty
in permitting the interest of the first transferee, created by language which if left unqualified
would have created an estate in fee simple absolute, to be cut down to an estate in fee simple
subject to an executory limitation by the subsequent language of the instrument. This rea-
soning disregards the generally accepted constructional practice of reading an instrument as a
whole, rather than reading its sentences seriatim." 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 189 (1950).
6. 158 N.E.2d 919 (Ohio C.P. 1959).
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of the one so dying shall revert to [his] other two surviving sisters or
brother and sister. .... "7 B predeceased A and C, so that item three
never became effective.' B's sole heir was B's son. The son also
predeceased A and C, who were his heirs. Consequently, A and C,
prior to their deaths, owned undivided half interests in fee simple
absolute in the property which they received under testator's will.
Under items two and three of testator's will, B received an un-
divided one-third interest in fee simple absolute in the residue of
testator's real and personal property, subject to the charge of the
legacies. B's interest was not defeasible, because, by its terms, item
three related only to the situation where either A or C predeceased B.
A received an undivided one-third interest in this property in fee
simple defeasible, subject to the charge of the legacies and to the
executory interests in B and C, which would vest only if A prede-
ceased both B and C. Similarly, C received a fee simple defeasible
in another undivided one-third, subject to the charge of the legacies
and subject to the executory interests in A and B, which would vest
only if C predeceased both A and B. When B predeceased A and C,
the interests of A and C were no longer defeasible. A and C were
tenants in common in fee simple absolute with B's son, who received
by descent B's undivided one-third interest.
The court's explanation of its decision in the Sheldon case, that
A, B, and C each received a vested indefeasible one-third of the
residuary estate, consists of inappropriate, inapplicable, and mislead-
ing statements. First, the court quotes from Ohio Jurisprudence.
A fee simple estate cannot be made defeasible, even under R.C. Sec-
tion 2131.07 (G.C. 10512-7), unless the words of the instrument de-
vising such estate indicate the specific real property upon which the
limitation is intended.9
The two cases cited in support of this statement are Sweigart v.
Sweigart0 and Gill v. Leach." This statement is certainly applicable
to the facts of Sweigart v. Sweigart, but not to the facts of Sheldon
v. Lewis. In the Sweigart case testatrix willed all her real and per-
sonal property to her husband absolutely, and then in the next item
of her will she provided that after her husband's death "all his real
and personal property" should go to testatrix' son. The court, on
the point under consideration, properly noted:
As we view the language of the testatrix, she gave to her husband
unrestricted tide to her property, both real and personal, and then she
7. Id. at 921.
8. Cf. In re Campbell's Will, 307 N.Y. 29, 119 N.E.2d 577 (1954) (estate to be divested
only upon death of A before B and C; no divestment when B predeceased A and C, then A
later predeceased C).
9. 20 OHIo Jul 2d Estates 5 180 (1956).
10. 89 N.E.2d 686 (Ohio Ct App. 1949).
11. 81 Ohio App. 480, 80 N.E.2d 256 (1947).
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attempted to will for her husband all of the real and personal property
which he might have at his death. She made no reference to any specific
property whatsoever, but simply undertook to will for her husband all
of his property, without reference to kind, description or how acquired.
Of course, the law does not permit her to execute a will for her husband,
nor can a fee simple estate be made defeasible even under Sec. 10,
512-7, G.C. unless the words of the instrument devising such estate
indicate the specific real property upon which the limitation is in-
tended.12 (Emphasis added.)
The case of Gill v. Leach did not consider the question whether
the property was specifically identified. Although the testamentary
gift was of "all the rest and residue" of testator's real and personal
property, the court properly assumed without comment that the prop-
erty had been sufficiently identified.
The decision in the Gill case is subject to criticism because it is
based upon the erroneous theory that if a fee is conveyed, it cannot
be made defeasible. The testator, in item three of his will, left all
his real and personal property to his wife without words of general
inheritance, such as "and her heirs in fee simple." In item four testa-
tor provided that at his wife's death all of this property "that shall
remain unused," was to be divided among four named persons. The
probate court, construing the will in its entirety and in accordance
with basic property law, properly held that the wife received a life
estate and the four named persons received the remainder. The
court of appeals reversed this decision because it was based upon a
"practical construction," which this reviewing court believed was not
in accordance with the law of Ohio, although it was in accordance
with the law of some other jurisdictions. 13
Returning to the opinion in the principal case, Sheldon v. Lewis,
the court's second reason for ignoring item three of the will was that
"there can be no estate left in testator after the devise of an absolute
estate."' 4  This statement begs the issue. Testator must not have
intended to devise, and under basic rules of construction did not de-
vise, the fee simple absolute to A and C in item two, because in read-
ing the will as a unit, item two is qualified by item three. 15 There-
fore, the quoted statement is incorrect. As its third explanation, the
12. 89 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949).
13. "'That, after a devise to one in general terms, without any words of inheritance or other
language showing an intention to create a fee simple, it is stated to whom the property shall
go upon the death of the devisee named, tends to show that he was intended to take, not a fee
simple estate, but one merely for life." 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 75 (3d ed. 1939).
14. 158 N.E.2d 919, 923 (Ohio C.P. 1959).
15. "The meaning expressed by the language employed in a conveyance is to be derived from
reading such conveyance as an entirety. Each sentence or paragraph is a single element in one
whole. It is reasonable to infer that their complementary or modifying force upon each other
was intended by the conveyor and this inference must be given effect by the construer. When
the clauses or paragraphs, read seriatim, involve repugnancies but, read as mutually modifying
one another, permit a construction as a consistent whole, the latter construction is adopted."
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 242, comment c (1940).
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court stated that a remainder cannot be grafted onto a fee. This
statement is true but inapplicable, because if the first estate is a fee,
it can be defeated by an executory interest. Item three is neither
irreconcilable nor repugnant to item two of testator's will. Courts
should seek the law not merely in their own cases and the cases of
other jurisdictions, but also in learned and critical discussions and
evaluations of these cases by recognized authorities. These discus-
sions are readily available in current texts on property law.16
The practice of creating legal undivided interests in real property
in two or more persons, especially when these interests are subject to
future interests, is not to be commended. If possible, the real prop-
erty of a deceased person should be sold as part of the administra-
tion of the estate and the net proceeds divided among the benefi-
ciaries. If a sale is not immediately desirable, then the real property
should be placed in trust with broad powers of administration and
sale in the trustee. If a trust is not acceptable, the draftsman should
fully advise the donor or testator of the hardship and problems which
will probably arise if future interests are imposed upon the legal owh-
ership in common of real or personal property. Perhaps the donor
or testator will then decide not to create the future interests. If all
of these methods fail and the donor or testator, although fully in-
formed, steadfastly insists upon legal common ownership of realty
plus future interests, the draftsman should use simple language that a
court can easily understand.
"DEATH WITHOUT CHILDREN" - ALTERNATIVE
FUTURE INTERESTS
In Trumbo v. Trumbo' testator left certain land to his wife for
her life and at her death to his son, subject to the executory limita-
tion that if the son should "die leaving no children," the land was to
go to the son's wife "as long as she may remain his widow." If the
son's widow remarried, the land was to go to testator's daughter "or
her children."
There are a number of points of poor draftsmanship which are
evident from testator's will. First, as a general rule the creation of
a legal future interest is not desirable. When management and sale
of realty require the consent of two or more persons, difficulties will
probably develop. Second, the phrase "die leaving no children," is
too restrictive, because testator probably meant "die leaving no is-
sue." ' Third, whenever there is a gift over upon death of a person
without issue, it raises the question which was before the court in
Trumbo v. Trumbo, that is, does the clause mean (1) death of the
16. SIms & SMnTH, THE LAW OF FuTuI INTmRsTs (2d ed. 1956); POWELL, REAL PROP-
ERTY (1950); AmmucAN LAW OF PROPERTY (1952); TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (1939).
17. 106 Ohio App. 382, 155 N.E.2d 62 (1957).
18. Snvms & SMITH, THE LAW OF Ftrrux Iamwsrs § 548 (2d ed. 1956).
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named person without issue before testator's death, (2) death of the
named person before the termination of life estates, or (3) death
of the named person at any time?"° The court, in accordance with
the Restatement of Property° and a number of courts, held that
when the son, who was the named person, survived his mother, who
was the life beneficiary, the son had a fee simple absolute which, of
course, would not be divested upon his later death without issue. The
draftsman should have specifically stated as of what time death with-
out issue must occur to divest the son's interest.
Fourth, presumably testator intended that in order for the son's
wife to take upon the son's death without issue the wife would have
to survive her husband. However, testator failed to state specifically
that the wife would have to survive to take. As a general rule, sur-
vivorship is not implied because a future interest is subject to another
form of contingency, such as death of testator's son without issue be-
fore his mother's death."
Fifth, the gift to testator's daughter "or her children" left unan-
swered whether the daughter, as a condition precedent, had to survive
to the time of the son's death without issue, assuming his death oc-
curred before the termination of the life estate, or to the time of the
life beneficiary's death.2 For example, suppose that the son died
without issue, survived by no widow, but survived by his mother and
his sister. At this point, under general rules of construction, the fu-
ture interest of testator's daughter may be a contingent remainder
and, as a condition precedent, the daughter must survive her mother
(the life beneficiary) in order to take. Consequently, if the daughter
predeceased her mother and left no surviving issue, the daughter's
estate would not be entitled to take upon the mother's death. This
is the position taken by the Restatement of Property.23 Another view
of the fact situation is that after the death of testator's son without
issue and survived by no widow, the daughter's interest is a vested re-
mainder subject to divestment only if the daughter predeceases her
mother and is survived by "children." The word "children," of
course, might be construed to have been used in the sense of issue.
Consequently, if prior to the mother's death the son died without is-
sue, and without a surviving widow, and the daughter died without
"children," the daughter's estate would be entitled to the property at
the mother's death.
24
Sixth, if the daughter's survival of the life beneficiary is a condi-
19. Id. § 540.
20. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 269 (1940).
21. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 21.25 (1952); SiMEs & SMITH, THE LAW OF FU-
TURE INTERESTS § 594 (2d ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 261 (1940).
22. SIMES & SMITH, THE LAW OF FuTuRE INTERESTS § 581 (2d ed. 1956); 5 AMERIcAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 21.24 (1952); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 252 (1940).
23. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 252 (1940).
24. SIMES & SMITH, THE LAW OF FuTURE INTERESTS 5 581 (2d ed. 1956).
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tion precedent, is survival by her "children" also a condition prece-
dent? For example, suppose the son predeceases his mother survived
by no issue and by no widow, and that the daughter thereafter also
predeceases her mother but is survived by a child. Later the daugh-
ter's child dies without issue, then the life beneficiary dies. Would
the child's estate take ?25
Seventh, did testator mean to restrict the alternative gift to the
daughter's "children" to immediate descendants of his daughter, or
did he intend that the word "children" should include grandchildren
and more remote descendants if their ancestors were dead? If "chil-
dren" is construed as "issue," what effect, if any, does this construc-
tion have on the question of the death of some or all of the issue
prior to the death of the life beneficiary? Suppose the daughter pre-
deceases her mother survived by one grandchild who later also pre-
deceases the life beneficiary and is survived by no issue. Assuming
that the son has predeceased his mother survived by no issue and by
no widow, does the grandchild's estate take? 26
Eighth, assuming that "death of the son without issue" means
death without issue prior to the termination of his mother's life es-
tate, if the son is survived by a widow is her estate defeated if she
remarries after the termination of the life estate?
Even though the ambiguities listed above may be resolved in a
specific jurisdiction by its courts' decisions, there is always a high
probability that such resolution may not be strictly in accordance with
testator's intention. In addition to the probability that litigation
would be required to resolve many of these ambiguities, the legal
draftsman and the testator can not always be certain when a will is
drafted as to what law will be applied in construing it. Since the law
where land is located controls, and since the land may be located out-
side the state in which the testator's will is drafted and executed, the
ideal will would contain no ambiguities such as those enumerated
above.
"DEATH WITHOUT ISSUE"
A4very v. Avery17 involved the will of a testator who died in 1917.
In this case testator devised 160 acres of land to his wife for life,
then devised to each of his four children 40 acres of this land with the
provision that "if, however, either of my children should die leaving
no issue, then the property devised to such shall be divided equally be-
tween the brothers and sisters then living." In 1955 the last surviv-
25. RESTATEMeNT, PROPERTY § 252, comment f (1940); SIMES & SMITH, THE LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS § 581 (2d ed. 1956).
26. IESTATEmENT, PROPERTY § 249, comment i (1940); SIMES & SMITH, THE LAW OF
PFuRE INTERESTS § 153 nn.35-37 (2d ed. 1956).
27. 107 Ohio App. 199, 157 NXE.2d 917 (1958).
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ing son of testator died, leaving no issue but survived by a sister, two
nieces, and a nephew.
According to the decision in Trumbo v. Trumbo,28 if the testator
in the Avery case had been survived by the life tenant, testator's wife,
death without issue of the son would have had to occur prior to the
death of the life tenant in order for the gift over to be effective. But
since the life tenant predeceased the testator, the court in the Avery
case held that each of the four children received a present fee simple
estate subject to its being defeated by death without issue, and per-
haps subject also to their being survived by at least one brother or
sister.
When there is a gift to two or more persons with a gift over to
the survivors upon the death of any without issue, the problem may
arise as to the disposition of the original interest of the last person to
die when he dies without issue, and also as to the disposition of any
subsequent interest which might have accrued to this survivor. For
example, property is willed to A, B, and C in fee simple subject to the
executory limitation that upon the death of any without issue, his in-
terest shall go to the survivors. A dies without issue and his one-third
interest is divided between B and C. B dies without issue. B's undi-
vided one-third interest goes to C. But what about the one-sixth
which B received from A? C dies without issue. Who takes C's
original one-third? Who takes the one-sixth C received from A and
the one-third C received from B ?29
It is interesting to note that with respect to the phrase "death
without issue," or a similar phrase, all of the Ohio cases except Avery
v. Avery are in accord with the preferred construction set forth in
the Restatement of Property. First, "death without issue" means
definite, and not indefinite failure of issue.30 Second, a testamentary
gift by T "to B and his heirs but if B dies without issue then to C and
his heirs" creates in B, if he survives T, a fee simple subject to an
executory limitation, and in C an executory interest which will vest if
B dies survived by no issue.3" Third, a testamentary gift "to B for
life then to C and his heirs but if C dies without issue then to D and
his heirs," where B, C, and D survive T, creates in C a fee simple
subject to an executory limitation, and in D an executory interest
which will vest if C predeceases B, and C is not survived by any issue.
If C survives B then C has a present fee simple absolute.32 Fourth,
28. 106 Ohio App. 382, 155 N.E.2d 62 (1957).
29. See SIMES & SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 547, 773, 774 (2d ed. 1956);
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 271 (1940).
30. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 266 (1940); Parish's Heirs v. Ferris, 6 Ohio St. 563
(1856).
31. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 267 (1940); Briggs v. Hopkins, 103 Ohio St. 321, 132
N.E. 843 (1921).
32. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 269 (1940); Trumbo v. Trumbo, 106 Ohio App. 382, 155
N.E.2d 62 (1957).
[June
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1959
a testamentary gift "to B for life, then to C and his heirs but if C
dies without issue then to D and his heirs" creates in C, when B pre-
deceases T but C and D survive T, a fee simple absolute according to
the Restatement of Property.3  But according to Avery v. Avery, C
receives a fee simple subject to an executory limitation and D re-
ceives an executory interest which will vest if C dies survived by no
issue. The reason for the position of the Restatement of Property
is that the limitation employed by T manifests T's intent "that C be
able to acquire an indefeasible interest before he dies, and this inter-
est must be observed despite the expiration of the interest limited in
favor of B."34
There is in the United States a definite need for greater uniform-
ity in the area of real'property law. If the courts of states in which
there is no strong or persuasive local policy opposed to the position
of the Restatement of Property on a specific issue would follow the
position of the Restatement, there would be a substantial increase in
uniformity. If, on the other hand, a particular jurisdiction decides
not to follow the position of the Restatement, then it should clearly
and specifically set forth its reasons for not doing so. In this way
sound and uniform legal principles would become more widely recog-
nized throughout the country.
MARITAL TRUST AND SPENDTHRIFT PROVISIONS
In Corey v. National Bank of Toledo,'5 the draftsman of tes-
tator's will provided in Item IX for a separate trust, Trust A, of
"assets equal in value to one-half (y2) of the value of [his] adjusted
gross estate as determined for Federal estate tax purposes. . .. "-6
The income from Trust A was payable to testator's wife for her life.
She was also given the
power, at any time and from time to time, and in all events, by means of
a written instrument signed by her and delivered to the Trustee during
her lifetime, or at her death by provision in her will which expressly
refers to her power of appointment hereunder, to appoint all or any part
of the principal to such one or more person or persons (including her-
self and/or her estate), in such share and amounts and in such manner,
as she may designate.3T
Unfortunately, Item X of the will was written in language which
apparently applied to all trusts, including Trust A, created by tes-
tator's will. Item X read in part:
If any beneficiary of any trust hereunder shall attempt at any time
or times to alienate.., any part of the income and/or principal reserved
33. RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY § 269 comment f (1940).
34. Ibid.
35. 159 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
36. Id. at 815.
37. Id. at 816.
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